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The existence of either “horizontal” fiscal externalities, in which changes in one jurisdiction’ policies 
affect the government budget of other jurisdictions and therefore the utility of its residents or 
“vertical” externalities, in which changes in one level of government’s policies affect the budget of 
another level of government, may lead to non-optimal government policies. These fiscal 
externalities, then, suggest the possibility of corrective policies. 
 
The focus here is on vertical externalities. In a growing literature, these externalities are associated 
with the extent that tax bases are shared or “co-occupied” by two different levels of government. 
Given that co-occupancy is the cause of or at least exacerbates the externality, I consider, the optimal 
“assignment” of the tax base and, more specifically, whether the co-occupancy of tax bases is 
desirable. Specifically, I examine the optimal extent of the tax base of a lower level of government 
(local) and a higher level (state) in a hierarchical system of governments. The co-occupancy of the 
tax base influences the magnitude and possible the direction of "vertical" fiscal externalities 
associated with the taxes of one or both of the levels of government. Using a model in which there 
is a continuum of commodities, each with the same demand characteristics, I formally consider 
whether, as has been asserted in a number of studies, whether it is optimal to eliminate all co-occu-
pancy between the tax bases of the two levels of government. 
 
While I find that it is indeed not optimal to have co-occupancy in the tax base in the absence of 
other corrective policies for the fiscal externality, eliminating co-occupancy does not, in general, 
eliminate fiscal externalities, meaning that tax rates can still be above or now below the socially-
optimal level. Thus elimination of co-occupancy in the tax base is not a substitute for a policy 
such as intergovernmental matching grants which directly eliminates fiscal externalities. If 
alternative policies are available such as matching grants that do eliminate fiscal externalities and 
governments are restricted to set the same tax rate on all commodities in their base, the optimal 
division of the tax base changes dramatically – optimality requires both governments tax the 
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*Corresponding author 1. Introduction 
  The concept of a "horizontal" fiscal externality arising from "tax competition" among governments at 
the same level has been the topic of numerous papers in the past twenty-five years.1 This literature focuses on 
the impact that one jurisdiction's taxes has on the welfare of residents in other jurisdictions.  Increases in taxes 
on a mobile tax base in one jurisdiction will lead to a decrease in the tax base (usually mobile capital) there but 
increases in the other jurisdictions' tax bases.  This "horizontal" fiscal externality is ignored by the jurisdiction 
raising (or lowering) its taxes.  Because it is a positive externality, the jurisdictional governments, if choosing pol-
icies to maximize the utility of their residents, will tax capital at too low a rate and underprovide public services. 
A number of studies, including Arnott and Grieson (1981), Gordon (1983), Wildasin (1984, 1989), Dahlby and 
Wilson (1994), Hoyt (1991), and Hoyt and Jensen (1996), have considered policies, most frequently intergovern-
mental grants, that might be employed by a higher level of government to "correct" horizontal fiscal externali-
ties. 
  More recently another fiscal externality, a "vertical" fiscal externality, has come to attention of re-
searchers beginning with Johnson (1988) and Flowers (1988) and continuing with Dahlby (1994,1996), Keen 
and Kotsogiannis (1996), Boadway and Keen (1996), Boadway, et. al. (1998), Keen (1998), Hoyt (2001), Dahlby 
and Wilson (2003), Wrede (1996, 2000), and Wilson and Janeba (2005) among others.  As the name "vertical" 
implies, this externalities arises between governments at different levels, for example, between state or provincial 
governments and local governments or federal and state or provincial governments.  In this case the focus is on 
the "overlap" in the tax bases of two levels of government.  An example from Dahlby (1996) empirically exa-
mined by Besley and Rosen (1998) is the excise taxes placed on cigarettes by both the federal and state govern-
ments in the United States.  Each state, when choosing its tax rate, presumably only considers the revenue it col-
lects from the tax and the costs of the tax to its residents.  Adopting the terminology of Dahlby (1996), the state 
will equate the benefits from this revenue to the private marginal cost of public funds (MCF) from the excise 
tax.  However, an increase in the state excise tax not only has an impact on the state tax revenues, but possibly 
other states' tax revenues due to cross-border shopping (a horizontal externality) and federal tax revenues by 
                                                      
1See Wilson (1999) for an extensive review of the literature on tax competition. reducing the demand for cigarettes and therefore the tax base for the federal government.  This means the social 
marginal cost of funds (SMCF) differs from the MCF because of these externalities.  While the horizontal fiscal 
externality is positive, the vertical externality is negative as it reduces federal revenues.  The vertical externality, 
then, will lead to the state overtaxing cigarettes. 
  As with the horizontal fiscal externalities, a number of studies (Flowers (1988), Dahlby (1996), Boad-
way and Keen (1996), Keen and Kotsogiannis (1996), Boadway et. al. (1998), and Hoyt (2001) among others) 
have considered policies by the higher level of government to correct for the vertical externalities imposed by 
taxation of the lower level of government.  Corrective policies include separating the tax bases of the two levels 
of government (Flowers, 1988); increasing the number of lower-level governments (Keen, 1995; Keen and Kot-
sogiannis, 1996); and providing intergovernmental grants (Dahlby, 1996; Boadway and Keen, 1996; Boadway, et. 
al., 1998; and Flochel and Madies, 2002). 
  With the exception of Dahlby (1996), Hoyt (2001), some of the discussion in Keen (1998) and Dahlby 
et. al. (2000) which examines both a profits and labor income tax, vertical fiscal externalities have been examined 
in the context of a single tax base, generally labor income, shared or "co-occupied" by two different levels of 
government.  Of course, this is a simplification as in most countries governments rely on a number of different 
tax bases and instruments. While this paper also examines the tax policies in a hierarchical system of govern-
ment in which vertical externalities exist, it departs from previous studies in a several ways.  First, rather than 
considering the implications of vertical externalities on tax policies when there is a single tax base that serves as 
the source of revenue for both levels of government (state and local), tax policy is considered with multiple tax 
bases. Specifically, I consider a large number (a continuum) of commodities to include in either or both of the 
two levels of governments' tax bases. The consideration of multiple commodities enables me to address the 
question of central interest to this paper -- how should the tax base be allocated between the two levels of 
government?  
  Vertical fiscal externalities act in both directions -- state taxes affect local revenues and local taxes affect 
state revenues. A number of studies (Flowers (1988), Keen (1995), Keen and Kotsogiannis (1996), Wrede (1996) 
for example) assume that both levels of government, when setting their tax policies, ignore the vertical external-
  2ity imposed on the other level of government.  This, then, will lead to excessive taxation at both levels of 
government if the governments provide a public service consumed by immobile residents.2  In Hoyt (2001) I 
also considered the case in which the higher level of government, the state, considers the impacts of its tax pol-
icies on the revenues of the local government, social-welfare maximizing policies. Here I consider both the pos-
sibility that the state government fully considers the impact of its tax policies on local revenues and the possibil-
ity that it does not fully account for or, at the extreme, ignores the impact its policies have on local tax revenues. 
That a higher level of government considers the impact of its grant or transfer policies, policies designed to cor-
rect externalities, on the policies of a lower level of government has been the focus of numerous studies inclu-
ding Arnott and Grieson (1981), Gordon (1983), Dahlby and Wilson (1994), Dahlby (1996), Boadway and Keen 
(1996), Wildasin (1984, 1989), and Boadway et. al. (1998). Hoyt (2001) demonstrates how the state government 
can use its tax policy, in the absence of grants, to ameliorate the impacts of vertical fiscal externalities on social 
welfare. While Hoyt (2001) focuses on the structure of taxes given the existing tax bases of the two levels of 
government, here I consider how the tax base should be designed to limit these fiscal externalities and maximize 
social welfare.  
  In addition to having far more than a single tax base and uniform taxation of that tax base, different 
levels of governments rely on very different sources of revenue. Table 1 gives a breakdown of the different sour-
ces of revenue for U.S. state, local, and the federal government aggregated to the national level for fiscal year 
2000. For state and local governments, there is only limited overlap or "co-occupancy" in sources of revenue, 
though, undoubtedly, there is a strong link among the alternative tax bases. For example, changes in the per-
sonal income tax, primarily a source of revenue for state governments, will undoubtedly affect property tax reve-
nue, primarily a local source of revenue. In contrast, there is much more apparent co-occupancy of the federal 
and state tax bases.  In contrast to the rather limited empirical work (at least relative to the voluminous theore-
tical work) horizontal fiscal externalities, a number of studies have examined how changes in tax rates for one 
level of government affect tax rates for another level of government.3 Besley and Rosen (1998) find that in-
                                                      
2Overprovision need not be the result if governments provide public inputs in production as in Wrede (2000) and 
Dahlby and Wilson (2003). 
3For a summary of the empirical work on horizontal fiscal competition see Brueckner (2005). 
  3creases in federal tax rates on gasoline in the US have significant positive impacts on state gasoline tax rates. 
Similarly Esteller-More and Sole-Olle (2001) find that increases in effective US federal tax rates increase US state 
income and sales tax rates; in contrast to the findings of Esteller-More and Sole Olle (2001), Goodspeed (2000), 
in a study using a panel of national and lower local income tax for 13 OECD countries, finds that higher 
national income tax rates lead to lower local income tax rates. This inverse relationship between the income tax 
rates of higher and lower level governments is also found in a panel study of the Swedish local and regional 
public sectors by Andersson et. al. (2004). 
  The issue addressed here, what level of government should tax what goods or services or inputs is re-
ferred to in the federalism literature as the “assignment” problem. In a surprisingly small literature, the best 
known discussion of the appropriate assignment of the tax base in a system of hierarchical governments is 
found in Musgrave (1983) with nice summaries found in Musgrave and Musgrave (1989), Oates (1994), and 
Keen (1998). Musgrave’s “principles” for tax assignment are that: 1) “highly” progressive taxes, particularly for 
the use of redistribution, should be done at a higher level of government; 2) lower-level governments should 
avoid taxes on highly mobile tax bases focusing on less mobile sources such as land; 3) the higher level govern-
ment should be responsible for taxing inequitably distributed resources; and 4) “benefit” taxes and user fees 
should be especially prevalent for lower-level governments.4 Musgrave did not address the issue of vertical fiscal 
externalities and how they might affect assignment. Keen (1998) does devote some discussion (and analysis) to 
co-occupancy and assignment by addressing the question of whether it is better to co-occupy an inelastic tax 
base, such as gasoline, or a more elastic tax base? Contrary to what might be the expected answer, that it is 
preferred to occupy an inelastic tax base in which changes in tax rates have less of an effect on the shared base, 
Keen shows that, in fact, the preferred base for co-occupancy is the more elastic base. 
  Here I address the assignment question using a very different framework from that of either Musgrave 
(1983) or Keen (1998). Rather than considering the type of tax base that should be taxed by different levels of 
government, I consider how to divide a uniform tax base among two levels of government and whether co-
occupancy is desirable or not. This framework, I believe, helps focus on the question of whether the existence 
                                                      
4 This summary borrows heavily from those of Musgrave and Musgrave (1989) and Oates (1994). 
  4of vertical fiscal externalities and the associated overprovision of public services might, as suggested by, among 
others, Flowers (1988), lead to the conclusion that there should be no or very limited co-occupancy among the 
tax bases of different levels of government. I confirm Flower’s conjecture that if optimally chosen, that is if the 
tax base is allocated among the two levels of government in a way to maximize social welfare, no co-occupancy 
is indeed socially optimal in the absence of any instruments such as matching grants that eliminate any fiscal ex-
ternalities. However, eliminating co-occupancy will not, in general, eliminate vertical fiscal externalities. Then 
even if co-occupancy is eliminated, if cross-price elasticities are nonzero, the tax rates set by the two levels of 
government will not be optimal. If the commodities in the tax base are gross substitutes, the elimination of co-
occupancy, while not eliminating the fiscal externality, will change it from being negative (if co-occupancy was 
extensive) to becoming positive, meaning that tax rates would change from being “too” high to being “too” low. 
Alternatively, with gross substitutes, if the overlap in tax bases is set to ensure the fiscal externality associated 
with tax rates is eliminated, the division of the tax base is still not optimal -- social welfare is increased by elimi-
nating the co-occupancy. While the division of the tax base between the two levels of governments obviously in-
fluences the vertical externalities associated with the tax rates, the extent and direction of the fiscal externalities 
associated with tax increases and the fiscal externalities associated with increases in tax bases can be quite dif-
ferent. In fact, it is possible, even likely, that with limited overlap there are positive fiscal externalities associated 
with tax increases but with any overlap in tax bases, regardless of the relationship between commodities, any in-
crease in the overlap of the two tax bases decreases social welfare. While the elimination of co-occupancy is 
social-welfare improving, it is because of the fiscal externalities associated with tax bases and not tax rates. Eli-
minating inefficiencies arising from fiscal externalities associated with tax rates must be addressed through other 
corrective policies.  
  While I show that it is not desirable to allocate the tax base among the two governments to eliminate 
the fiscal externalities from taxes, elimination of these fiscal externalities will dramatically change the optimal 
structure of the two governments’ tax bases. Here I show that if matching grants are used to eliminate the ver-
tical fiscal externalities associated with tax increases, then given the requirement that all commodities be taxed at 
the same rate by each level government, social welfare is maximized only when both governments tax all com-
  5modities – the entire tax base is co-occupied. Thus the policy of eliminating co-occupancy is only desirable if the 
fiscal externalities associated with tax rates cannot be eliminated using other instruments. 
 In  Section 2 I outline the model and framework for analysis. In Section 3 I consider the tax rates and tax 
bases that would be chosen by both levels of government if these government could, in fact, choose the base 
they tax. The optimal tax base for the different levels of government is considered in Section 4. In this section I 
first consider the question of how to divide the tax base between the two levels of government in the absence of 
any overlap. I then consider whether and under what conditions, would co-occupancy be socially optimal. In 
Section 5, I briefly discuss how the tax base should be allocated among the governments if matching intergovern-
mental grants are used to eliminate the fiscal externalities associated with the taxes. Section 6 considers extensions 
and concludes. 
2.  A Simple Model of Optimal Tax Base Division 
I consider a model with a single state government and n local governments. Each locality has a single 
(representative) resident with all residents being identical. Each government finances a public service to pro-
vide to its residents with gs being the level provided by the state government and gj, j =1,…, n , the level pro-
vided by locality j. The public services are produced with constant costs with the cost function for the federal 
government service cf(gs) = ngs, and the cost functions for each locality j is given by ci(gi) = gj, j=1,…,n.  While 
there are n independent local governments, each government has the same policy objectives and instruments 
as well as identical residents. To simplify the analysis simpler and focus on what I believe are the issues of 
most interest, I assume that the number of localities is large enough so that no individual locality considers 
the impacts its policies have on state revenues. Then in equilibrium all localities will, independently, choose 
the same policies. Given this symmetry, I shall refer to “local” policies denoted by the subscript l and for 
most of the analysis suppress notation referring to specific localities. 
In addition to public services, residents consume private commodities. Following Wilson (1989), I 
consider a continuum of these private commodities identified on the interval [0,1]. I denote the gross of tax 
price of commodity i, x(i), by q(i) with the net price of all commodities being unity.  Since my interest is in 
how to divide the tax base between the two levels of government, I assume identical demand functions over 
  6the set of commodities. That is, when prices are identical, the quantity demanded is the same for the 
commodities or more formally, 
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In addition to this continuum of commodities, there is a single commodity z that is untaxed.6 
 
As each local government and the state government assess commodity taxes to finance their public 
services, the gross price of each commodity depends on whether it is part of the local government’s tax base 
and/or the state government’s tax base. Localities also are restricted to uniform tax rates withτj being locality 
j’s tax on any commodity in the set of commodities taxed by it. The equilibrium, identical local tax rates are 
denoted by τl.  
Localities are restricted to taxing the set of commodities on the interval [0, l k ]. The set taxed by the 
state government is on the interval [ s k ,1]. Since with co-occupancy it is possible for  l kk > s let the length of 
the interval only taxed by the local government, [0, min( l k , s k )]≡ kl and the length of the interval taxed only 
by the state government, [ max( l k , s k ),1] ≡ ks. The set taxed by both governments is the interval [ s k , l k ] ≡ 
kls if  l kk > s
                                                     
. The distribution of the tax base is depicted in Figure 1.  Then the gross of tax price for the 
commodities in locality j can be summarized by 
 
5 This, of course, should be viewed as an approximate since commodities facing different prices will not have the same 







, this approximation enables to me to 
focus on the essential question of allocating the uniform tax base between the two levels of government.  While the 
specific formulation of some of the results would be somewhat modified if we relaxed this assumption, the conclu-
sions obtained, as least qualitatively, are unaffected. An example of a utility function that satisfies (2.1) is the CES 
function, 
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  As I assume the utility function is separable in private consumption and the two public services, the 
indirect utility function for a resident of locality j can be expressed as 
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where I denote the sub-utility function with respect to prices by   and suppress the argument for 
z as it is untaxed. 
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  Let the objective function for the locality j’s government be given by  









Since, as discussed earlier, I assume that local governments ignore the impact of their policies on state reve-
nues, I do not include state public services as an argument in the local government’s welfare function.7 Analo-
gously, for the state government I consider the objective function,  
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where  [ ] 0,1 S α ∈ . If the state government is maximizing aggregate utility in the state αs = 1while αS < 1 
means a lower weight placed on local services, possibly due to voter/resident ignorance of the impacts of 
state decisions on local services. In the analysis that follows, I focus on two cases: 1) when the state govern-
ment ignores its impacts on local revenues ( ) 0 = s α  and 2) when the state government maximizes aggregate 
utility () 1 = s α .  
Let Xj  and XSj  j=1,…,n denote the local tax base and the state tax in locality j. In a symmetric equi-
librium with all localities setting the same tax rate, let the tax bases be denoted by  s s s ls ls X kx kx ≡+ and 
ll ll s l s X kx kx ≡+  where the terms xs, xl, and xls denotes the demand for commodities subject to only the state 
                                                      
7  In earlier versions I consider the case when the local governments take into account the impact their tax decisions 
have on the provision of public services to the extent that it affects the utility of the resident of that locality. 
  8tax, only to the local tax, and to both taxes. Then the government budget constraints for the state govern-
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3.  Externalities and the Endogenous Choice of Tax Base 
In the United States, the choice of tax base, that is what local governments can tax, is not at the dis-
cretion of local government but instead determined by state governments.8 While this may be the case, it still 
may be useful to examine what tax base local governments would choose if given the option. Then I begin by 
considering the problem facing both local governments and the state government if they can choose both 
their tax rate and the extent of their base.9 The tax rate and base are chosen in Nash equilibrium among all 
local governments and the state government. Since all localities have the same objective and the state must set 
the same tax rates in all localities, in this equilibrium all localities will have the same tax rate and tax base. We 
denote the common equilibrium local tax rate and base by τl and  l k .  
As mentioned, the problem facing any locality j is to maximize its welfare function given the tax rates 
and bases of the other localities and the state government. Then formally we have 
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where  ) , , , ( s j s j j k k g τ τ is defined by the government budget constraints, (2.6). In a symmetric equilibrium 
the welfare-maximizing local tax rate and base, τl and  l k , satisfy the conditions, 
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and 
                                                      
8   States can and do regulate tax rates as well. State restrictions on local tax rates and bases are both examples of Dillon’s 
Rule, the 1868 Iowa State Supreme Court opinion of John M. Dillon who wrote that municipalities were “the mere 
tenants at the will of the legislature” (Dillon, 1911, p. 448). 
9  I ignore the possibility of horizontal fiscal externalities, that is, the possibility that changes in the tax rates in one locality 
affect the tax revenues collected in other localities. The implications of horizontal fiscal externalities are discussed in 
the concluding section. 
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= .  Derivation of (3.2) is found in the Appendix. Critical to understanding  
the policy choices of both governments and the optimality of these decisions is how changes in tax rates  
 
and tax bases affect tax revenues. Derivations of the impacts of changes in the tax rates and tax bases on  
 
tax revenues are also found in the Appendix. Note that in (3.2b), given the discrete change in the price of 
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an expansion of the tax base also depends on whether there is an existing overlap ( l kk > s ) or not.  If  
 
there is overlap then the addition of  l k directly adds xls to the local base but reduces the state tax base by 
reducing x( l k ) from xs to xls a decrease of τ1x11. 
  Analogous to the local governments, the state government sets its tax rate and base to maximize its 
welfare function. Formally, the problem the state government is facing is 
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Then in the Nash equilibrium, the state’s tax rate and base must satisfy the first order conditions,  
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3.1  Externalities and the Choice of Taxes 
While the tax rate that satisfies (3.2) maximizes the utility of each locality’s residents given the poli-
cies of the n-1 other localities and the state government, these policies, in general, do not maximize social wel-
fare. This is because a locality’s tax rates affects state tax revenue and therefore the level of the state service 
for the residents of the n-1 other localities. Analogously, if the state government does not fully weigh the local  
services in its welfare function (αs<1), it, too, will also generate a fiscal externality. To determine the fiscal ex-
  10ternality from a locality’s tax, differentiate aggregate utility  with respect to the tax rate of a 
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to express it in terms of marginal costs of funds gives 
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where  10 EMCFl is the external marginal cost of funds associated with an increase in local spending. Intu-
itively, the external marginal cost of funds depends on the product of the marginal rate of substitution for the 
state service and the change in state revenue, the product of the state tax rate and the change in the state tax 
base. The number of localities and the weight placed by local governments on state services matter as well as 
they determine how much of the impact of local policies is on state services are “internalized” into the local 
tax decision. The external marginal cost of funds for the state is analogously to that of the local governments 
and is given by 
0. l D >
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with Ds > 0 and, of course, the number of state government units equaling one.  From (3.6) we obtain several 
insights into vertical externalities:  
Proposition 1. a) Assume that αs ≠ 1. Then: 
 
i) Sign{EMCFl} = Sign{EMCFs}; 
ii)  ( )( )
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k
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iii)   If the commodities are not gross substitutes (x12 ≤ 0) then EMCFj > 0, j=l,s; 
iv)   If the tax bases for the local government and the state government are identical then EMCFj > 0, j = l, s. 
b)  If  the state maximizes aggregate utility (αs = 1) then EMCFs = 0. 
                                                      
10The term Dl  () ( ) ( ) 11 21 () l l ls ls l l ls l ls kx k x k k x k k x =+ + τ + + + > 0 ; Ds is defined analogously. 
  11 
Part a) of the proposition indicates symmetry in the externalities. The signs of the state and local ex-
ternalities are always the same, though not necessarily negative as part ii) indicates. If commodities are gross 
complements, an increase in the price of any commodity reduces the demand for all other commodities, 
thereby decreasing both tax bases; if commodities are gross substitutes, an increase in the local (state) tax rate 
on the overlapping base will decrease the demand for commodities in the overlapping base thereby reducing 
the state (local) tax base. However, increases in the local (state) tax base increase the part of the state (local) 
tax base that does not overlap. Thus, the sign of EMCFj, j=l,s depends on two distinct factors – the own price 
elasticity relative to the cross-price elasticities and the extent of the overlap of the tax base relative to the ex-
tent that the tax bases are independent. They will, however, both be negative if both governments tax the en-
tire base. As Part b) indicates there is no externality associated with the state’s tax rate if it chooses its tax rate 
to maximize aggregate utility. In this case it fully internalizes the impact of its tax policies on local services. In 
contrast, as long as there is more than one locality, there will be fiscal externalities associated with local tax 







⎡⎤ ++ ⎣⎦ −≠ . 
In Table 2 I use (3.7) to determine the number (length of interval) of overlapping commodities at 
which EMCFl is equal to zero. I normalize the total number of taxable commodities to be 100 and exoge-
nously choose the number of commodities in the local tax base to be 25, 50, or 75. In addition, I allow the 
own-price elasticity of demand to vary as well. From the consumer’s budget constraint and symmetry we have 
the condition () ( 21 11 11 ) ε ε Κ− =− + where εij is the elasticity of demand for good i with respect to the price 
of good j to define the cross price elasticity and K is the number of commodities.11 The results of this numeri-
cal example suggest that the amount of possible overlap can be potentially quite large with the extent of the 
overlap increasing with the magnitude of the own-price elasticity of demand. This, of course, is because the 
  12greater (more negative) the own-price elasticity the stronger the substitutes are the commodities in the tax 
base. Note there is not an obvious simple relationship between overlap and the extent of the local tax base.  
3.2  The Choice of Tax Base 
To characterize the choice of tax base for the local governments, first evaluate 
l
l
k W (3.2b) at kls=0 
using the first order condition with respect to the tax rate (3.2a) to simplify.12 This gives  
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l l τ .          (3.8a) 
 
From (3.8a) it is apparent that the local government will always choose to tax a commodity not taxed by the 
state government. In equilibrium, then, no commodity will be untaxed. Evaluating (3.2b) with kls > 0, again 









lll s l s l l s k k
ll s
Vx
WM R S k k
kk >
τ−
⎡ =τ − τ + τ ⎣ +
k ⎤ + τ ⎦ .    (3.8b) 
 
The sign of (3.8b) is almost certainly positive as it reflects the impacts on local revenues and the impact on the 
price of x( l k ).  
  Then, from examination of the tax base chosen by the localities, (3.8), we know that in equilibrium 
there will be some co-occupancy of the tax base with localities choosing to tax the entire base.  
Then we can focus on the state’s choice of tax base given kls > 0. Evaluating 
s
s
k W with kls > 0 and using (3.4a) 
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Term (a), the impacts of the increase in the state tax base on state public services and the price of  ( ) s x k  on 
state welfare is positive. However, the impact on local services (term (b)) is negative, reducing the increases in 
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11  Using a discrete version, we have  which gives 
() () ()() ( ) ( )
1
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.When q(i)=q(j) then x(i)=x(j) and we obtain ( ) ( ) 21 11 11 ε ε Κ− =− + . 
  13state welfare from expanding its tax base. Then given the weight (αs) the state places on local public services, 
the sign of (3.9) appears ambiguous. However from (3.8b), we know that ks will equal zero (local governments 
will tax the entire base). Then in (3.9) term (b) equals zero and term (a) reduces to klsMRSsτs making
s
s
k W >0.  
Proposition 2: Assume both the local and state governments independently choose their tax bases.  
a)  Then the equilibrium tax bases are such that both levels of government tax the entire tax base, that is,  1
*
= l k  and 
*
0 s k = . 
b) Assume  αs=1. In equilibrium, MRSs > MRSl. 
 
  Regardless of the valuation of local public services by the state government and whether its tax pol-
icies create any fiscal externalities, with many localities, both levels of governments will choose to tax the en-
tire base and thereby have identical tax bases. Then from Proposition 1 if αs ≠1 with identical tax bases both fis-
cal externalities will be negative, meaning that the equilibrium tax rates exceed the social welfare maximizing 
rates. As shown in the Appendix, if αs = 1, that is, the state sets its policies to maximize aggregate utility, the 
marginal rate of substitution for the state public service will exceed that of the local public service – the local 
public service, relative to the state service, is overprovided.  
  Finally, as with the tax rate, we can examine the impact of the expansion of the tax base on social 
welfare. When there is no co-occupancy, kls= 0, the impact on social welfare of an increase in the local tax 
base is given by 
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where  . Term (a) of (3.10) is the impact on the welfare of locality j 
and term (b) is the impact on utility in all localities due to the change in the state public service. If commodi- 
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ties are substitutes (x21>0), then (3.10) is clearly positive as expanding the local tax base not only reduces the  
 
marginal cost of funds for local services but also reduces it for the state funds by increasing the demand for 
commodities in the state tax base. If, commodities are complements (x21<0) then expansions in the local tax 
base act to increase the marginal cost of funds for the state government by reducing demand for the commo-
 
12   See Appendix for derivation of (3.8) and (3.9). 
  14dities in its tax base. The impacts with co-occupancy are summarized in Proposition 3 below.  
Proposition 3.  
a) Assume  that  αs = 1 with  1
*
= l k  and 
*
0 s k = . Then:  
i)     
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ii) 
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b)  Assume that with αs = 0,  1
*
= l k  and 
*
0 s k = . Then: 
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       (3.12b) 
When both levels of government tax the entire base, there is a tradeoff between the gain from ex-
panding the base for one government and the reduction in the revenue for the other level of government. We 
provided two expressions of the impact of an increase of the local tax base. There is a gain from expanding 
the local tax base, a reduction in the marginal cost of funds for local taxes( ) x MRS 11 l lτ − . The direct impact, 
MRSl–MRSs is, as shown in Proposition 2, negative, making the impact of an increase in the local tax base ambi-
guous.  Part a.ii) simply states that if the state government is choosing policies to maximize social welfare 
(αs=1) then given the local government taxes the entire base it is clearly welfare maximizing for the state to 
do so as well. Finally, consider the case when 0 = s α . As (3.12) suggests, it is possible for either   0 >
l k W  or 
0 < W
s k with the possibility that both conditions hold, that is, that a decrease in either tax base would reduce 
utility. As our expressions for 
l k W and 
s k W suggest, reducing the tax base of either level of government would 
reduce social welfare if the marginal rates of substitution or, equivalently in this case, the tax rates are appro-
ximately equal and commodities are substitutes. 
  An implication of Proposition 3 is that if both governments are taxing the entire base, it is not neces-
sarily welfare improving to (marginally) reduce the tax base of one or both of the levels of government. For 
  15the case in which  1 = s α and x21 > 0 then a decrease in the local tax base may reduce welfare if MRSl is not 
significantly below MRSs. Whe 0 = n s  α , if MRSs ≈MRSl ,( ) s l τ τ ≈ and x21 > 0 then a decrease in either tax 
base would decrease welfare. Essentially we would be moving from an equilibrium in which all commodities
are taxed equally to one in which there is not uniform taxation and, as a result, one in which MRSl and MRSs 
are no longer equ
 
al. 
4.  Optimal Tax Base Division and Co-Occupancy  
When given the option with a large number of local governments, both levels of government choose 
to tax the entire tax base. Reductions in the extent of one government’s tax base may or may not be socially 
optimal given the tax base chosen by the other government. Here I address the question of the social-welfare 
maximizing division of the tax base as well as whether co-occupancy is optimal. I first address the question of 
how the tax base should be divided between the two levels of government if there is to be no co-occupancy. 
After deriving the optimal division of the tax base, the question of whether the state and local governments 
should share tax bases, that is, whether there should be any overlap in the two tax bases, is then addressed.   
Before formally examining the problem of how to divide the tax base between the two levels of gov-
ernment in the absence of co-occupancy, consider what would characterize the “ideal” division of the tax 
base. This division would yield what might be considered the “second-best” outcome, the outcome achieved 
when a single government (state) finances both services and can set any tax rate it desires on the commodi-
ties. Given our simple model in which all commodities have the same own-price and cross-price elasticities, if 
possible, the tax rates levied by the two levels of government should be equal. Since the marginal cost is the 
same for the two public services, their marginal rates of substitution (with respect to the private commodities) 
should also be equal. However, the agency or government determining the division of the tax base does so 
without any control over how the state and local governments set their tax rates given the division of the tax 
base. As will be shown, the “ideal” outcomes of τl = τs and MRSl = MRSs are generally not both obtainable. 
Thus, in the absence of co-occupancy, this ideal outcome is generally not possible, suggests that the optimal-
ity of the overlap of the two tax bases should be not be dismissed immediately. 
 
  164.1  The Optimal Division of the Tax Base in the Absence of Co-occupancy 
  Continuing with the same notation as used in Section 3, in the absence of co-occupancy we have a 








x kd k ∫ . Given the tax rates chosen by the state govern-
ment, s τ , and the local government,  l τ , the problem facing a social planner determining the optimal division 
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where the social planner, by choosing the extent of the local tax base, determines the extent of the state tax 
base since  l kk = s . As an alternative to the Nash equilibrium I consider here, the social planner could be a 
Stackelberg leader choosing the division of the tax base first. In that case, the social planner chooses the divi-
sion of the tax base considering the impact of its choice on the tax rates chosen by the state and local govern-
ments. Since the results of the two approaches appear to be very similar in their implications for tax policy, I 
chose to focus on the simpler Nash equilibrium.13 The first order condition for (4.1) in the symmetric equili-
brium can be expressed as 
  () () ( )( ) [] . 0 1 1 21 = − + + − − − = s l s s s l l l s s s l l l y
P
k x k MRS k MRS x MRS x MRS V W
l τ τ τ τ τ τ   (4.2) 
 











= ( s l l l x k x ) τ τ − + 21 . The addition of x( l k ) to the local tax base and its removal from the state 
base affects the local tax base by the direct increase in the base by adding x( l k ) = xl and by the impact of the  
 
change of the tax rate on x( l k ) on the demand for the other commodities in the local tax base. Analogously, 
the marginal decrease in the state tax base is 21() s sl xk x s − +τ − τ . Finally, there is the change in utility asso-
ciated with the change in the price of commodity of x( l k ). The first order approximation to this discrete 
                                                      
13 In the Stackelberg equilibrium the first order condition for (4.1) is 
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  17change in price of (τ1 - τs) is ( s s l l y x x V ) τ τ − − . Using the first order conditions for state and local tax rates, 
(3.2a) and (3.4a) in (4.2) gives  
() [] [ ] [ ] . 0 1 21 1 11 21 11 1 = + + − + − = x k x MRS x k x MRS V W s s s s l s s l l y
P
kl τ τ τ τ α τ τ      (4.3) 
 
To better understand the implications of (4.2) and (4.3) for the division of the tax base between the two levels 
of governments as well as the tax rates they set let ( ) ( ) l sl k and k ττ l  denote the tax rates chosen by the 
state and local governments for  l k . Further assume that  ( ) ( ) '0 ' l sl k and k 0 l τ >τ < , that decreasing the 
state tax base will increase the state tax rate and increasing the local tax base will decrease the local tax rate.  
Then let  and  denote the tax rate and marginal rate of substitution for govern-
ment j at the division of the tax base that satisfies (4.3), 
s l j
p
j , , = τ s l j MRS
s
j , , =
p
l k . Then it follows that: 
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simultaneously satisfie
b)  If the state maximizes aggregate utility (αs = 1) and x21≠ 0, then the conditions  and 
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Proof of Proposition 4 is found in the Appendix. If x21 = 0, there are no externalities generated by either govern-
ment when there is no co-occupancy and the marginal cost of funds (MCF) depends only on the tax rates and 
not the division of the tax base. Then for any division of the tax base in which  , it follows that 
. However, if x21 ≠ 0, then the division of the tax base does affect the marginal cost of 












l τ τ =
s α − 2
1 will both conditions simultane-
ously be satisfied. Note that when the state government is maximizing aggregate utility (αs =1) then there is 
no division of the tax base for which both conditions can be satisfied. 
  Proposition 4 suggests that the conditions  and  are unlikely to be obtained 








l MRS MRS =
≠0. What is less obvious is how the optimal division of the tax 
base might, in fact, be characterized. When kls = 0, using the first order conditions for the tax rates, (3.2a) and 
  18(3.4a) we obtain 
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When αs = 0, the sign of MRSl – MRSs is the sign of τl – τs, the level of government with the higher tax rate 
also has its public service relatively underprovided. From (4.3) it is relatively easy to see that  0 ) (< >
P W
5 . = l l k k  
if  and the optimal tax base, () () .5 ( ) .5 ls τ> < τ   
p
τ f αs = 1, our other case of i rest, the relationship between the tax rates and margina
is less clear. If commodities are substitutes
l k , will be greater or less than .5, depending on whether 
> < τ. I nte l 
rates of substitution 
() () .5 ( ) .5 ls
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Pro on 5 is  in th ppend  th  for which we can de of of Propositi  found e a ix. For e cases termine the optimal 
division of the tax base, the results with  1 = s α follow those found with αs = 0. Essentially, if it is the case 
that when the tax base is evenly divided ( ) 5 . = l k and we either have: a) ( ) ( ) 5 . 5 . S L τ τ >  and MRS > MRS or 
b) () () 5 . 5 .
l s
S L τ τ <  and MRSl < MRSs, we  the tax base for the lev ment with the higher ta
rates  te of substitution for its public service. With 0
increase  el of govern x 
and marginal ra 21 ≠ x (or the case discuss in Proposition 4), 
the optimal division of the tax base only can occur when  ( )
p
l l k τ  > ( )
p
l s k τ , and MRSl < MRSs or  ( )
p
l l k τ  < 
( )
p
n of a public service by one of the two levels of government. In Table 3 we provide the results o
some numerical simulations in which equation (4.3) was examined using a very simply parameterization. T
number (length) of commodities is set at 100. Income is 140. Public services are chosen so that the sum of 
demand, in the absence of distorting taxes is 40 with the allocation for the two governments varying through
the course of the exercise. In the absence of taxes, one unit of each commodity is consumed. Three own-
price elasticities were reported, -1, -.5 and -2 with consistent cross-price elasticities. We undertake simulati
for both the case of αs = 0 as well as the case of 1





= s α . The optimal division of the tax base, as well as the tax 
rates and marginal rates of substitution are report r each of the simulations. 
Finally, we might consider whether the elimination of co-occupancy of th
ed fo
e tax base leads to social-
welfare 
 
maximizing tax rates for the two levels of government. Then differentiating the social welfare func-
tion with respect to the tax rate for a local government gives 
21
1
x k k V
n
W l s s gs l τ τ = .             ( 4 . 6 a )  
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The impact on social welfare depe the chang
 
 
nds on  e in the tax revenue of the other level of govern-  
  20m d the extent to which this impact has been incorporated into the choice of taxes by the level of 
government. An increase in revenue will increase social welfare; a decrease in revenue will decrease socia
welfare. Then it follows that: 
Proposition 6: Assume that the tax
ent an
l 
 base is optimally divided between the two governments. Then at the optimal division: 




blic services are not equal and 
tax incre
 
b)   if x21> 0, an increase in the tax rates of both or either government will increase social welfare; 
c)   if x21<0, a decrease in the tax rates of both or either government will increase social welfare. 
Only if the cross-price elasticities between commodities equal zero are the tax ra
is is because elimination of the co-occupancy eliminates the fiscal externality in this case. With non-
zero cross-price elasticities, elimination of co-occupancy does not eliminate the fiscal externality. In the case 
of gross substitutes, it may change the fiscal externality from being negative with co-occupancy to being posi-
tive with no co-occupancy. This, in turn, means that taxes also change from being “too” high to being “too” 
low, below the welfare maximizing rates. Regardless, elimination of co-occupancy, even with the optimal div-
ision of the tax base does not eliminate fiscal externalities associated with the tax rates set by the two levels of
government if the governments do not internalize the externalities themselves when choosing their tax rates. 
4.2  The Optimal Co-Occupancy of Tax Bases with Independent Governments 
That, in general, tax rates and marginal rates of substitutions for the pu
ases or decreases can enhance social welfare suggests the possibility that co-occupancy could be de-
sirable. To formally determine if co-occupancy is desirable, consider the problem of determining the optimal
(social-welfare maximizing) local tax base given the extent of the state tax base,  
1
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P V k k k k vqk d k V
0
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l
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g kk V g kk + τ ∫ (4.7) 
The distinction between (4.7) and (4.1) is that here 
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Simplifying (4.7) similarly to (4.2) using τ1x11 ≈ xs – xls and xl+τsxll ≈ xls gives 
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Analogously for an increase in the state tax base (decrease in  l k ) we have  
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Term (a) in both (4.9a) and (4.9b) gives the increase in welfare from expanding the tax base to an untaxed 
commodity in (4.7a) an expansion of the local tax base and in (4.7b) an expansion of the state tax base. Term 
(b) in both expressions gives the impact of expanding the overlap in tax bases on revenue.   
  Our interest is in the impact of an expansion of the tax base of either level of government when 
there is no co-occupancy (kls=0) and the tax base is optimal divided between the two governments. Given an 
optimal division of the tax base, term (a) in (4.9a) equals term (a) in (4.9b) since the condition describing the 
optimal division of the tax base, (4.2), is simply term (a) from (4.9b) subtracted from term (a) in (4.9a). Then 
given term (b) is the same in both equations, it must be the case that if an increase in the local tax base will in-
crease social welfare when the tax base is optimally divided, so must an increase in the state tax base. Using 
the first order condition for the local tax, (3.2a), in (4.9a) and evaluating at kls = 0 we can express  P
kl W as: 
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Using the first order conditions for the state taxes, (3.4a) with αs = 0 in (4.9b) gives 
 









− + + = −
=
11
) ( ) (
21 11
0









s τ τ τ τ      (4.10b)  
 
Term (a) of both (4.10a) and (4.10b) are both negative. While term (b) of (4.10a) is positive if τl > τs term (b) of 
(4.10b) will be negative in this case; if  τs > τl , term (b) of (4.10b) will be positive but term (b) of (4.10a) must 
be negative. Then it follows that both (4.10a) and (4.10b) cannot both be positive and therefore co-occu-
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Then, as with the case of αs = 0, clearly we cannot have both (4.10a) and (4.10b’) both be positive. Sum-
  22marizing: 
Proposition 7: Co-occupancy of the tax base is never optimal if the tax base is optimally divided in the absence of co-occupancy, 
that is, if the division of tax base satisfies (4.2). 
 
  Of course, if the tax base is not optimally divided, specifically if it is the case that τl > τs and MRSl 
>MRSs or τs > τl and MRSs > MRSl, then co-occupancy could be welfare-improving. One of the most in-
teresting aspects of this result is that it is true regardless of the cross-price elasticities of the commodities and, 
consequently, the extent and direction of the vertical fiscal externality arising from tax increases. Of course, if 
x21 = 0, there is no vertical fiscal externality in the absence of co-occupancy and if x21 < 0 having or increasing 
the overlap in the two tax bases only serves to increase the negative fiscal externality, so the result is not un-
expected in either of these two cases. However, if x21 > 0, then in the absence of any overlap a positive fiscal 
externality exists. Then co-occupancy could, in fact, eliminate any fiscal externality as discussed in Section 3. 
This, too, is not optimal. Then while arguments for eliminating co-occupancy generally seem premised on the 
notion of eliminating a fiscal externality associated with the tax rates, eliminating co-occupancy is still desir-
able even if it increases a (positive) fiscal externality.  In Table 3, the last two rows show the impact on social 
welfare of increases in a marginal (1 commodity) overlap of the tax base when the tax base is optimal divided 
for several alternative parameterizations.  
  Underlying suggestions to eliminate co-occupancy to eliminate fiscal externalities might be the impli-
cit assumption that x21 = 0. If this is the case, the only fiscal externalities arising occur due to the overlap in 
the tax base. If x21 ≠ 0, specifically if x21 > 0, with all commodities being gross substitutes, elimination of an 
fiscal externality arising from taxes requires that the tax bases be set so that 
  () () ( 0 21 11 = + + + =
∂
∂
x k k k k x k
R
l ls s ls ls s
l
s τ
τ ) .        (4.11) 
If kls> 0, the fiscal externality associated with an increase in the local tax base is given by 
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If the tax bases are set so that the fiscal externality associated with changes in tax rates are eliminated, that is 
(4.11) is satisfied, using (4.11) in (4.12) gives 


















.         (4.13) 
  While the fiscal externality associated with the tax rate is eliminated by the overlap in the tax base, the 
fiscal externality associated with the tax base will not be eliminated. With all commodities being gross substi-
tutes, the overlap needed to eliminate fiscal externalities from the tax rate generates a negative fiscal external-
ity associated with the tax base.   In the absence of x21 = 0, the fiscal externalities associated with tax rates are 
distinct from those associated with the bases and elimination of the fiscal externalities from taxes will not eli-
minate the fiscal externalities associated with the tax bases. 
5.  Optimal Tax Bases with Intergovernmental Grants 
  The result that co-occupancy is not optimal if the tax base is optimally divided means that in general 
an optimally designed tax base will not eliminate fiscal externalities. This, of course, suggests that there is still 
a role for intergovernmental (matching) grants that internalize any fiscal externalities associated with the tax 
rates. If intergovernmental grants are used, then, what should the optimal division of the tax base be? The 
second-best outcome, given the use of distorting taxes, would be to have equal tax rates on all commodities 
and to have MRSs = MRSl. Here, I demonstrate that this outcome can be obtain even if x21 ≠ 0 but only 
when both governments tax the entire tax base and the appropriate matching grant (tax) is imposed on local 
governments. 
  I assume throughout this discussion that the fiscal externality is only caused by the local govern-
ment’s tax policies, that is, αs=1. Then following Dahlby (1996) and Hoyt (2001), for example, let there be a 
matching grant (tax) imposed on the local government such that the local governments budget constraint is 
given by:   
  () l l l g X m = − τ 1           (5.1) 
where m is the matching grant with m > 0 implying a transfer of funds from the local governments to the 
state government. The state budget constraint is given by    
  s l l s s g X m X = + τ τ           (5.2) 
  24In contrast to both Dahlby (1996) and Hoyt (2001), a single, uniform tax rate is applied on all commodities in 
a government’s tax base. Specifically, the tax rate on commodities in the co-occupied tax base is the same as 
the rate on the parts of the tax bases that do not overlap. Consistent with this tax structure, a single matching 
rate is also set for any commodity in the local government’s tax base.15 
  Then following Dahlby (1996) and Hoyt (2001) set the matching rate, m, so that the fiscal externality 
is eliminated, that is, 
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The first order condition for the state government, with αs = 1, is 
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= = .16       (5.6) 
 
Then using the expressions for MRSl from (5.5) and for MRSs (and MRSl)  in (5.6) we can see that MRSs = 
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15 Dahlby (1996) and Hoyt (2001) both allow matching grants that vary with the commodity. In the framework used 
here that would imply different rates for commodities in the co-occupied section of the tax base and for the 
commodities in the section of the tax base only taxed by the local government. 







































  25 
Equation (5.7) will only be satisfied with x21 ≠ 0 if the two tax bases are the same, Xl = XS. 
  Then the optimal tax bases for the two governments with and without the matching grant are pro-
foundly different. If matching grants are not available or are not set to eliminate the fiscal externalities asso-
ciated with the tax rates, there should be no overlap in the two level of governments tax bases; if the fiscal ex-
ternalities from taxes are eliminated by some other policy intervention, such as a matching grant, complete 
co-occupancy of the tax base, the unconstrained choices of the governments, is welfare-maximizing.  
6.  Extensions and Conclusion 
While most literature on vertical fiscal externalities is very recent, there are some suggested policies to 
correct for inefficiencies associated with the existence of these vertical fiscal externalities that have begun to 
emerge. The most frequent policy recommendation is the use of intergovernmental grants to correct any mis-
allocation of funds between levels of government and to force governments to internalize the fiscal external-
ity. Another suggested policy is to reduce the existence of fiscal externalities by limiting the co-occupancy of 
the tax base. 
It is this suggested remedy that is the focus of this paper. In fact, I find that complete elimination of 
co-occupancy is optimal if the tax base is optimally divided in the absence of co-occupancy and other correc-
tive policies are not available. This result is true regardless of the cross-price elasticities among commodities 
and whether or not the vertical fiscal externality is positive or negative. However, this policy generally does 
not lead to the governments setting social-welfare maximizing tax rates, thus suggesting that other corrective 
policies are still desirable. If other corrective policies are used to eliminate fiscal externalities, complete co-oc-
cupancy of the tax base, not the elimination of co-occupancy, is socially optimal to ensure equal taxation of 
commodities (the optimal tax policy in this model) and that both governments face the same marginal cost of 
funds. 
One extension to consider is the question of which commodities should be included in each tax base 
when commodities are not identical and they do not have identical cross-price elasticities. This extension 
would bring the analysis in closer alignment with the framework for addressing the assignment problem un-
derlying Musgrave (1983). In a framework with collection costs, Wilson (1989) finds that when adding a com-
  26modity to the set of taxable commodities, it should be the strongest available substitute with the existing set 
of taxable commodities. Does a similar result apply here or does substitution with the tax base of the other 
government need to also be considered? 
Another possible extensions merit further research. In the simple model presented here there were 
no horizontal fiscal externalities as there was no flow of tax base between different localities. Recent studies 
by Wilson and Janeba (2005) and Flochel and Madies (2002) consider both vertical and horizontal fiscal 
externalities though not with multiple tax bases. Relatively simple adjustments to the model would provide 
the opportunity to consider how local and state tax bases should be designed when these externalities also 
exist. It would seem likely that commodities or tax bases that flow between localities ideally would not be 
included in local tax bases. 
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Table 1: Share of Tax Revenue, State and Local Governments by Source by State, 2000 
(Top row: State Sources; Bottom Row: Local Sources) 

















U.S. Federal  0  8  0  8  2.4  0.7  0.6  65.3  17.1  5.6  --- 
All States  2.4  49.3  33.3  16.0  6.2  0.9  1.8  31.9  7.0  6.4  13.5 
All Local 73.7  15.8  11.0  4.8 0.3  0.1  0.1  4.9  1.0  4.1  20.9 
Alabama  2.8 50.1  26.4  23.7  7.8  1.9  1.0  32.2  3.8  8.1  17.2 
  39.0  45.6  39.2  6.4  1.6 1.1 0.5 2.9  0.0 11.7  27.7 
Alaska  3.1 9.7  0.0  9.7  3.0  0.9  3.4  0.0  30.8  53.9 54.8 
  80.7 16.4  12.0  4.4  0.0  0.1  0.5  0.0  0.0  1.7  21.7 
Arizona  3.7 57.3  44.8  12.5  7.3  0.6  2.0  28.3  6.5  2.4  12.5 
  69.0 27.3  23.3  3.9  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  3.8  17.4 
Arkansas  9.9 48.5  35.0  13.5  8.0  0.6  1.9  30.2  4.9  4.1  14.0 
  44.4 53.6  45.2  8.4  0.0  0.1  0.0  0.0  0.0  2.1  22.5 
California  4.0 35.3  28.0  7.4  3.6  0.3  1.5  47.2  7.9  3.4  9.2 
  63.2 27.8  19.3  8.5  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  9.0  21.2 
Colorado  0.0 38.3  26.1  12.2  7.7  0.4  1.0  51.4  4.7  3.1  14.9 
  59.9 34.8  31.4  3.5  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  4.7  25.1 
Connecticut  0.0 49.7  33.6  16.1  5.3  0.4  1.3  39.1  4.2  4.8  14.8 
  98.7 0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  1.3  10.0 
Delaware  0.0 13.6  0.0  13.6  4.9  0.5  1.3  34.4  11.3  39.2  26.6 
  78.6  1.7  0.0  1.7  0.0 0.0 0.0 8.5  0.0 11.2  19.8 
Florida  3.1  77.1  60.5  16.6  6.5 2.3 1.8 0.0  4.8 11.3  12.7 
  77.9 18.3  3.2  15.1  3.2  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  3.6  28.2 
Georgia  0.4 42.5  34.3  8.3  4.7  1.0  0.6  47.1  5.3  3.0  11.6 
  60.4 36.5  29.8  6.7  0.0  1.1  0.0  0.0  0.0  3.1  22.0 
Idaho  0.0 61.5  46.1  15.5  2.2  1.2  1.3  31.9  2.3  2.0  18.2 
  78.6 11.6  0.0  11.6  7.9  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  3.2  25.2 
Illinois  0.0 44.4  31.4  12.9  8.8  0.3  1.2  40.6  5.3  5.2  13.5 
  94.6 1.6  0.0  1.6  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  3.3  26.7 
Indiana  0.2 47.7  28.1  19.6  6.0  0.6  2.1  33.5  9.9  4.2  11.9 
  82.8 14.4  5.1  9.4  1.1  0.0  0.4  0.0  0.0  2.3  16.8 
Iowa  0.0 49.8  35.4  14.4  6.9  0.3  0.9  37.1  9.2  2.2  18.6 
  88.6 1.2  0.0  1.2  0.0  0.0  0.0  8.2  0.0  1.9  24.5 
Kansas  0.0 47.8  33.2  14.6  6.7  0.2  1.9  36.5  4.1  5.1  17.4 
  89.5 7.5  5.9  1.7  0.0  0.0  0.0  1.3  0.0  1.2  24.1 
Kentucky  1.0 47.5  35.9  11.6  7.3  1.5  1.1  38.4  5.6  4.5  12.6 
  76.8 21.0  17.0  4.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  2.1  22.8 
Louisiana  5.1 45.6  28.2  17.4  5.7  0.9  0.2  35.1  4.0  7.7  13.4 
  53.8 7.0  0.0  7.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  30.1  0.0  8.4  23.4 
Maine  0.4  57.1  31.6  25.5  8.4 0.8 1.4  24.3  3.4 13.1  19.0 
  39.3 57.3  51.7  5.6  0.0  0.1  0.0  0.0  0.0  3.3  23.1 
Maryland  1.1 44.8  31.8  12.9  6.8  1.3  2.8  40.5  5.6  5.4  16.8 
  97.9 0.3  0.0  0.3  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  1.0  15.3 
Massachusetts  2.5 42.1  24.1  18.0  6.3  0.2  2.0  44.6  4.2  5.0  16.1 
  57.4 3.3  0.0  3.3  0.0  0.0  0.0  32.0  0.0  7.3  16.2 
Michigan  0.0 31.3  22.1  9.3  4.0  0.4  1.7  56.0  8.1  3.2  17.1 
  96.9 1.2  0.0  1.2  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  1.9  10.9 
Minnesota  7.5 43.0  33.7  9.3  4.7  0.6  2.7  31.6  10.5  3.9  14.9 
  89.4 1.4  0.0  1.4  0.0  0.0  0.0  6.2  0.0  3.0  19.9 
Mississippi  0.1 43.3  27.9  15.4  4.6  0.5  1.4  41.6  6.0  4.2  11.8 
  94.2 2.8  0.7  2.1  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  2.9  25.1 
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Missouri  0.0 66.8  49.5  17.3  8.9  0.8  1.2  21.4  4.8  4.6  11.9 
  92.0 3.5  0.0  3.5  0.5  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  4.5  31.2 
Montana  0.2 47.0  32.5  14.5  8.1  0.3  1.3  41.4  3.1  5.4  13.1 
  59.0 31.4 23.0  8.4  0.0  0.0  0.3  5.2  0.0  4.2  21.1 
Nebraska  15.5 24.4  0.0  24.4  13.4  1.2  1.0  36.6  7.1  12.5  20.9 
  95.6 0.2  0.0  0.2  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  2.4  25.3 
Nevada  0.1 48.5  34.5  14.0  9.4  0.6  1.6  39.4  4.7  4.5  18.7 
  77.5 12.3  9.5  2.8  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  9.2  17.2 
2.5 84.8  52.2  32.6  7.0  0.4  1.7  0.0  0.0  9.6  9.6  New 
Hampshire  63.8 20.5  5.7  14.8  3.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  15.7  25.8 
New Jersey  27.9 32.8  0.0  32.8  6.9  0.7  5.6  3.9  18.4  13.2  20.5 
  98.2 0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  1.8  12.2 
New Mexico  0.0 45.2  30.4  14.8  2.8  0.4  2.2  39.7  7.4  5.7  15.0 
  98.3 0.2  0.0  0.2  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.2  0.0  1.2  15.2 
New York  0.9 53.6  40.1  13.5  6.2  1.0  0.6  23.5  4.3  13.9  18.5 
  55.4 40.3 34.6  5.8  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  4.3  18.1 
North Carolina  0.0 31.9  20.5  11.4  1.2  0.4  1.6  55.6  6.6  4.4  9.4 
  55.8 20.3 17.5  2.8  0.0  0.0  0.1  12.1  7.3  4.2  15.0 
North Dakota  0.0 38.8  22.0  16.8  7.0  1.3  0.3  47.1  7.8  3.8  11.2 
  75.2 20.6 18.7  1.9  0.0  0.1  0.0  0.0  0.0  3.9  25.9 
Ohio  0.2 55.9  28.2  27.7  9.4  0.5  1.9  16.9  6.7  16.6  18.9 
  88.1 9.9  8.6  1.3  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  2.0  22.2 
Oklahoma  0.1 46.0  31.8  14.2  7.1  0.4  1.5  41.9  3.2  5.7  11.6 
  65.4 8.9  8.0  0.9  0.1  0.1  0.0  22.0  0.0  3.0  19.9 
Oregon  0.0 37.3  24.7  12.7  6.9  1.0  1.3  36.5  3.3  11.9  14.5 
  54.0 43.7 39.9  3.8  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  2.2  27.8 
Pennsylvania  0.0 12.2 0.0  12.2  8.0  0.2  3.2  68.9  6.8  5.8  16.5 
  80.5 5.3  0.0  5.3  0.3  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  14.0  24.2 
Rhode Island  0.5 46.6  31.4  15.1  3.4  0.8  1.4  30.1  7.6  11.7  15.9 
  70.5 2.7  1.2  1.5  0.0  0.0  0.0  17.8  0.0  9.0  17.9 
0.2 50.8  38.5  12.3  5.8  2.0  0.5  38.3  3.6  5.4  16.0  South Carolina 
84.4 7.6 3.1  4.4  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  7.6  29.7 
South Dakota  0.0 79.0  52.6  26.4  13.5  1.2  2.1  0.0  4.9  11.9  19.4 
  78.2 17.5 17.2  0.3  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  2.0  17.8 
Tennessee  0.0 75.0  57.4  17.6  10.2  1.0  1.1  2.3  7.9  11.7  10.9 
  61.5 32.2 26.7  5.5  0.0  2.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  4.2  21.3 
Texas  0.0 81.0  51.1  29.9  9.8  1.9  1.9  0.0  0.0  15.6  14.8 
  79.9 17.6 13.5  4.1  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  1.4  21.4 
Utah  0.0 48.4  35.8  12.6  8.3  0.6  1.2  41.5  4.4  3.8  17.9 
  68.8 26.7 22.1  4.6  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  4.5  20.1 
Vermont  27.3 32.6 14.5  18.1  4.1  1.0  1.7  29.1  3.0  5.6  16.5 
  96.2 0.3 0.0  0.3  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  3.5  11.1 
Virginia  0.3 34.4  19.5  14.9  6.4  1.0  0.1  54.0  4.5  4.4  19.0 
  70.6 19.2 8.8  10.4  0.0  0.0  0.4  0.0  0.0  8.8  17.7 
Washington  13.5 77.1 61.6  15.5  6.2  1.3  2.2  0.0  0.0  7.1  11.4 
  61.5 29.1 19.1  10.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  7.4  23.6 
West Virginia  0.1 53.8  27.4  26.4  7.2  0.3  1.0  28.9  6.5  8.0  14.9 
  83.6 3.6 0.0  3.6  0.0  0.3  0.0  0.0  0.0  12.8  24.4 
Wisconsin  0.7 40.6  27.9  12.7  7.3  0.3  2.1  47.3  4.6  4.4  12.1 
  93.8 3.8 3.2  0.6  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  2.4  16.2 
Wyoming  10.5 49.5 38.3  11.2  8.4  0.1  1.1  0.0  0.0  34.6  9.4 
  76.0 19.8 17.6  2.2  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  2.5  30.0 
 
  31Table 2:  Number of Overlapping Commodities at which EMCF = 0 
  Own-Price Elasticity of Demand 
  -1.25  -1.5  -2  -3  -4  -5 
Local Tax Base  25  25  25  25  25  25 
Overlapping Base  4.5  8.4  15.1  25.2  32.3  37.7 
State Tax Base  70.5  66.6  59.9  49.8  42.7  37.3 
Local Tax Base  50  50  50  50  50  50 
Overlapping  Base  5.6  10.1 16.8 25.1  30.1  33.4 
State Tax Base  44.4  39.9  33.2  24.9  19.9  16.6 
Local Tax Base  75  75  75  75  75  75 
Overlapping Base  4.0  6.9  10.8  15.1  17.4  18.8 
State Tax Base  21.0  18.1  14.2  9.9  7.6  6.2 
 
 
Table 3: A  Numerical Determination of the Optimal Division of the Tax Base 
 
  1 (x11 = -1, x21 = 0)  2 (x11 = -.5, x21 = -.01)  3 (x11 = -2, x21 = 0.01) 
Ratio of Services (gl/gs)  1.00 1.67 3.00 7.00 1.00 1.67 3.00 7.00 1.00 1.67 3.00  7.00
Local Public Service (gl)  10.02 12.52 15.03 17.53 10.83 13.41 15.80 16.11  8.76 11.27 13.97 16.89
State Public Service (gs)  10.02 7.51 5.01 2.50 10.83 8.12 5.36 1.34 8.76 6.41 4.18  2.05
Obtained Ratio of Services  1.00 1.67 3.00 7.00 1.00 1.65 2.95  12.03 1.00 1.76 3.34  8.23
Local Tax Base (kl)  50 62.5 75 87.5 50 65.0  78.6  92.4 50  63 75.8  88.2
Local MRS (MRSl)  1.62 1.62 1.62 1.62 1.54 1.55 1.57 1.72 1.78 1.75 1.71  1.67
State MRS (MRSs)  1.62 1.62 1.62 1.62 1.54 1.54 1.55 2.52 1.78 1.81 1.84  1.87
Ratio of MRS  1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.01 1.01 0.68 1.00 0.96 0.93  0.89
Local Tax Rate (τl)  0.28 0.28 0.28 0.28 0.32 0.30 0.29 0.24 0.23 0.24 0.25  0.26
State Tax Rate (τs)  0.28 0.28 0.28 0.28 0.32 0.35 0.38 0.15 0.23 0.22 0.21  0.21
Ratio of Tax Rates  1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.86 0.75 1.58 1.00 1.08 1.17  1.26
p
l l l k k k W
=
 
-0.12 -0.12 -0.12 -0.12 -0.12 -0.11 -0.11 -0.35 -0.14 -0.15 -0.16 -0.17
p
l l s k k k W
=
−  
-0.12 -0.12 -0.12 -0.12 -0.12 -0.13 -0.14 -0.18 -0.14 -0.13 -0.12 -0.12
 





State Tax Base 
Local  Tax Base 
1  kl  kls  ks 
s k   l k  
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A.1  Impacts of Changes in Tax Bases and Rates on Revenue 
Differentiating (2.6) gives the impact of an increase in the state tax (j=s) or in the local tax rate (j=1) on the 
tax bases, 
() ( ) ( ) 11 21 () ,
jj
ls ls j j ls j j ls j
j
X
kx kx k k x k k x j ls
⎡⎤ ∂τ ⎣⎦ =+ + + τ + + =
∂τ
,                (A.1.1a) 
and  
[ ] () () 11 21 () , , , ;
ii
ul s l s i l s j
j
X




=τ + + + = ≠
∂
i .                 (A.1.1b) 
Then the impact of increasing the local tax base on local revenues is given by 






x k k x z ls if k k z l if k k
dk
τ
⎡⎤ =τ +τ + = ≥ = < ⎣⎦              (A1.2a) 
and the impact on state revenue is given by 
[ ] () 11 21 ,1 ,0 ,
ss
ls l ls l s s
l
dX
s Dxk k xD i f k k D i f k k
dk
τ
⎡⎤ =ττ + + = ≥ = < ⎣⎦ .              (A1.2b) 
Analogously, the impact of decreasing the state base (increasing s k ) on state tax revenues is given by 






s x k k x z ls if k k z s if k k
dk
τ
⎡⎤ =− τ +τ + = ≥ = < ⎣⎦    (A1.3a) 
and the impact of decreasing the state tax base on local revenue is given by 
[ ] () 11 21 ,1 , 0 ,
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ls l ls l s l
s
dX
s Dxk k x D i f k k D i f k k
dk
τ
⎡⎤ =− ττ + + = ≥ = < ⎣⎦ .   (A1.3b) 
where I approximate the change in demand for other commodities as a result of the decrease in price of 












. The difference in the demand for com-
modity  () j x k  with and without the tax by government j is approximated by -x11τj.  Recall that increasing  
s k is decreasing the state tax base and hence the opposite signs of (2.8) for an increase in  s k  and an increase 
in  l k . 
 
A.2  Derivations and Proofs from Section 3 
 
A.2.1  The First Order Conditions for Choice of Tax Base and Tax Rate 
 
Derivation of (3.2a): 
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From the first order conditions for consumers we have: 
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Then from the first order conditions we have: 
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Let the budget constraint be expressed as: 
1
0
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              ( A . 2 . 8 )  
Then using (A.2.8) (with λ = Vy) and (A.1.2a and A.1.2b) in (A.2.1) gives (3.2a).  
 
Derivation of (3.2b): 
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∂ ∫  = 
( ) (,()1 ) ll yl Vx kq k −= + τ τ l .  Using (A.1.3a) and (A.1.3b) in (A.2.9) gives (3.2b). 
 
A.2.2  Determination of the Choice of Tax Base 
 
Evaluate (3.2b) at kls=0 this gives  
  34() [] 21 x k x MRS x V W l l l l l l y
l
kl τ τ + + − =                       (A.2.10) 
The first order condition for the tax rate when kls=0 (from (3.2a)) is 
() ( ) [ 0 1 21 11 = + + − = x k x MRS x MRS k V W l l l l l l y
l
l τ τ ]                    (A.2.11)  
 
Then subtracting (A.2.11) from (A.2.10) gives (3.8a). 
 
Evaluating (3.2b) with kls > 0 gives  
  ( ) () [ 21 x k k x MRS x V W ls l l ls l ls l y
l
kl + + + − = τ τ ]                    (A.2.12) 
and evaluating (3.2a) with kls > 0 gives 
  () ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) [] 0 1 21 11 = + + + + + − = x k k x k k MRS x k x k MRS V W ls l s ls l l ls ls l l l y
l
l τ τ             (A.2.13) 
Then using (A.2.13) in (A.2.12) gives 
  () () ( ) ( ) [] 0 1 11 = + − − −
+
= x MRS k k x x k MRS
k k
V





τ              (A.2.14) 
which, using  11 s ls l x xx τ≈ −  can be simplified to obtain (3.8b). 
 
A.2.3  Proof Proposition 2c) 
 
From (3.2a) when  1 = s α  and  1 l k =  
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From (3.3a) when  0 s k = and αs = 1,  
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A.2.3  Proposition 3 and Impacts of an Expansion of the Tax Base on Social Welfare 
 
No co-occupancy (kls= 0): 
In absence of any co-occupancy, , the impact of an expansion in a local tax base on the (n-1) other 
jurisdictions is: 
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, the impact of the 
change in state services on the residents of locality j. Then we obtain (3.10a). 
 
Complete Co-occupancy ( ) 0 , 1 = = s l k k : With co-occupancy the impact of the other n-1 localities is 
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, giving  (3.11a). The impact of an increase in the state tax base, (3.11), can be found analogously. 
 
Proposition 3b) 
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The first order conditions for taxes when kls = 1: 
  () ( ) [] 0 1 21 11 = + + − = x x MRS x MRS V W l l l y
l
l τ τ                    (A.2.22a)  
() () ( ) 11 21 11 21 0
s
s
ys l l s s WVx M R Sxx M R S x xx τ ⎡⎤ =− + α τ ++ + τ + = ⎣⎦              (A.2.22b)  
Then from (A.2.22a): 
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and from (A.2.22b): 
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With αs = 0 we have 
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  36Evaluating the welfare impacts of an increase in the local tax base when kls = 1 is can be found by using 
(A.2.27) in (A.2.20) to give (3.12a). 
 
A.3  Derivations and Proofs from Section 4 
 
A.3.1  Proof of Proposition 4 
 
Part a): The first order conditions for taxes (with equal tax rates) as 
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Then from (A.4.1) we solve for 
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and 
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So for MRSs = MRSl and τl = τs it follows from (A.4.2) that 
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Then setting MRSl = MRSs in (A.4.5) gives 
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Then simplifying we obtain: 
() ( ) 21 21 21 21 0 ls l l l s M R Sx xk x x xk x k x k x 11 11 =+ τ + =+ τ + − τ → τ =                (A.4.6’) 
 
A.3.2 Proposition  5 
Part a.i) and Part b.i and b.ii), the conditions under which  5 ). (< >
p
l k follows from the assumption that 
( ) ( ) ( ) l s l l l k k k W τ τ , ,  is strictly concave in l k . 
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where Sj  = -(x11+kj x21). Then we can express the left side of (4.2) as 
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a.iii)   If we express (4.2) as 
 
[] [ ] ( )
() () ()
21 21 0 () ()
b a c
ss s l s l l l l s sl l MRS x k x MRS x k x xx ττ ττ l s s τ ττ + τ + = −+ − + − − .(A.4.9)  
Then if x21 > 0, then from Proposition 5.b we have  Æ   Then it follows that term (c) 
of (4.6)>0 implying (a)+ (b)<0. Since term (b>0) then term (a)<0. Further, the bracketed term in (a) is of 
smaller absolute value then the bracketed term in (b) ( ) meaning that for the sum of (a) and (b) to be 
negative that MRSsτs > MRSlτl. Then since τl > τs it must be the case that MRSs > MRSl. An analogous (and 
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